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THE LIABILITY OF WATER COMPANIES FOR FIRE
LOSSES
T is a general principle, of very wide application, that a municipal
corporation, in the absence of a statute, is not obliged to undertake the execution of governmental functions respecting the health,
peace or property of its citizens. Nor is such corporation liable for
the insufficient or negligent execution of such functions in case it
undertakes to perform them. The ground of this exemption is that
the municipality, in these matters, exercises discretionary powers
conferred upon it by the state, and acts, not for itself in its corporate
capacity, but for the general public as an agent of the central government.
A city, authorized to equip and maintain a fire department, to
appoint and remove its officers, and to make regulations respecting
their conduct and the management of fires, may or may not undertake to exercise-that authority; and in case it does do so, it is not
liable for losses suffered by property owners by reason of.defective
apparatus, insufficient equipment, or the negligence of the firemen
employed. It is deemed that the corporation is here engaged in the
performance of a-public service, from which it derives-no special
benefit in its corporate capacity; and the members of the fire department, when acting in discharge of their duties, are in effect public
officers, and not servants or agents of the city for whose conduct the
city can be held liable.' In an -early case in Indiana, Brinkmeyer v.
City of Evanssile,2 it was sought to evade this general rule on the
ground that while it was discretionary with the city whether or not
to undertake the maintenance of a fire department, yet when once
the city had exercised its discretion by undertaking to give protection against fire, all else became mere ministerial duties, and the city
was bound at its peril to make that protection adequate. But the
court refused to impose upon the city any such liability.
The same doctrine has been repeatedly affirmed respecting the
non-liability of cities, which own and operate waterworks, for
failure to adequately supply all parts of the city with fire hydrants,
and for negligence in maintaining an insufficient pressure for fire
purposes. It seems to be conceded that the supplying of water for
general fire purposes is a discretionary, governmental function, as
distinguished from one which is purely ministerial and necessarily
2 Hayes v. City of Oshkosh (1873), 33 Wis. 314; Dillon on Municipal Corporations
(4th Ed.), § 976; Heller v. The Mayor (1873), 53 MO. 159; Wheeler v. City of Cincinnati
(x869), i9 Ohio St. i.
2

(z867),

29 Ind. 187.
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incident to the corporate life of a municipality. Perhaps no better
statement of the difference between these two classes of functions
has been given than that of Judge Gray in Springfield Insurance Co.
v. Keeseville, 3 where he says:
"The distinction, between the public and private powers conferred
upon municipal corporations, although the line of demarcation at
times may be difficult to ascertain, is generally clear enough:
*

*

*

When we find that the power conferred has relation to

public purposes and is for the public good, it is to be classified as
governmental in its nature, and it appertains to the corporation in
its political character. But when it relates to the accomplishment
of private corporate purposes, in which the public is only indirectly
concerned, it is private in its nature and the municipal corporation,
in respect to its exercise, is regarded as a legal individual. In the
former case, the corporation is exempt from all liability, whether
for non-user or misuser; while in the latter case, it may be held to
that degree of responsibility 'which would attach to an ordinary
private corporation."
And it was held that, under this rule, the village of Keeseville
was not liable for damages caused by fire in consequence of its
negligent failure to maintain sufficient waterworks.
The same rule has been applied in many similar cases, and it has
invariably been held that the municipality was not liable for loss
by fire due to such negligence on its part. Thus in Tainter v.
Worcester, where the city had cut off a street hydrant near plaintiff's mill because of her failure to .pay water rates, by reason
whereof her mill was lost by fire, the court said: "The protection
of all the buildings in a city or town from destruction or injury by
fire is for the benefit of all the inhabitants and for their relief from
a common danger; and cities and towns are therefore authorized by
general laws to provide and diaintain fire engines, reservoirs and
hydrants to supply water for the extinguishment of fires. * * *
The city did not, by accepting the statute and building its works
tinder it, enter into any contract with, or assume any liability to, the
owners of property to furnish means or water for the extinguishment of fires, upon which an action can be maintained." The very
elaborate opinion in Mendel v. City of Wheeling,5 containing a
full citation of authorities, lays down the same rule, which is also
followed in Wright v. City Council of Augusta,' and in other cases
which it is unnecessary to mention.
' (1895), 148 N. Y. 46.
4 (1877), 123 Mass. 311.
1 (1886), 28 W. Va. 233.
f (886), 78 Ga. 241, 6 Am. St. Rep. 256.
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Nor can the city by contract render itself liable for failure to
furnish an adequate supply of wates, for sucb a contract would
tend to restrict the discretion of the municipaity beyond the scope
of the charter, and would therefore be void.7
It being clear, then, that a municipal corporation is not liable,
either in contract or tort, for fire losses due to its negligent failure
to furnish a proper public water supply, does the same immunity
attach to a private corporation under contract with the municipality
to provide water for general fire purposes?
It may be said, by way of introduction to the main question, that
a water company which contracts directly with a consumer to
furnish him an adequate water supply for fire purposes, is liable
for such fire losses as may be sustained by the promisee by reason
of a breach of the contract. In Middlesex Water Co. v. Knappmann Whiting Co.8 the water company had expressly contracted
with the defendant to furnish it with water suitable for drinking
purposes and other domestic uses, and for use in steam boilers, and
with a sufficient pressure for fire purposes. The defendant's factory
caught fire and was destroyed because of the failure of the water
company to supply water according to its contract. And the water
company was held liable for the loss, notwithstanding that the
failure was due to no negligence on its part, but wholly to an unforeseen and unavoidable accident. A similar contract was held to
create a like liability in Middlesex Water Co. v. Sawyer.9 So in
New Orleans, etc. Co. v. Meridian Waterworks Co.' 0 the plairftiff
contracted with defendant for a full, adequate and sufficient supply
of good, pure water, not less than sixty pounds pressure, for all
purposes for which water might be needed or used at the plaintiff's
shops. And it was held that plaintiff might show by legal evidence
that the furnishing of water for fire purposes was, under the circumstances of the case, withifi the purview of the contract, and if
that were proved, ttfe plaintiff might recover the amount of the
loss by fire due to insufficient pressure.
In each of the cases just referred to, however, there was a contract between the property owner and the water company, for a
valuable consideration moving from the former to the latter, and
hence there was no question of the legal right to bring an action
for the breach. But.the situation now to be discussed is radically
different, in this, that the contract is made by the municipal corpo7Black v. City of Columbia (1883), 19 S. C.
Van Horn v,. City of Des Moines
412;

(1884), 63 Iowa 447.
(r9oo), 64 N. 3. L. 240, 49 L. R. A. 572.
(i9oo), 65 N. J. L. 374.
10 (x896), r8 C. C. A. sig.
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ration with the water company, and an individual property holder
attempts to sue for losses resulting from a breach of- it. The
specific question presented is, In this class of cases, is it a fatal
objection to an action ex contractu that the plaintiff is a stranger
to the contract?
The earliest American case on the general question of the liability
of water companies for losses due to fire, is Nickerson v. Bridgeport
Hydraulic Co.,"' and the court there held that the want of privity
was fatal to the action. The court said: "The most that can be
said is, that the defendants were under obligation to the city to
supply the hydrants with water. The city owed a public duty to
the plaintiffs to extinguish their fire. The hydrants were not supplied with water, and so the city was unable to perform its duty.
We think it is clear that there was no contract relation between the
defendants and the plaintiffs, and consequently no duty which could
be the basis of a legal claim."
The year following the above decision, the same question came
before the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Fosterv. Lookout Water
Co.,"' and it was again held, without further discussion, that there
was no privity of contract, and hence no right to sue, the Nickerson
case being cited and approved. The Supreme Court of Georgia,
in Fowler v. Athens City Waterworks Co.,"3 based a similar conclusion on the same ground. To the same effect are Beck v. Kittanning Water Co.,' 4 Boston Safe-Deposit Co. v. Salem Water Co., 15
and Wainwright v. Queens County Water Co.' 6
But the question can hardly be disposed of in this summary way,
because privity, in the strict legal sense, is not always necessary as
the foundation for a suit on a contract. This was recognized in
Davis v. Clinton Waterworks Co.,' 7 where the plaintiff sought to
recover damages for a loss by fire due to defendant's failure to
provide an adequate fire pressure under its contract with the city.
The court sustained a demurrer to the petition, saying: "It is a
rule of law, familiar to the profession, that a privity of contract must
exist between the parties to an action upon a contract. * * *
Exceptions to this rule exist, which must not be regarded as abrogating the rule itself. Thus, if one under a contract receives goods
or property to which another, not a party to the contract, is entitled,
11 (1878), 46 Conn. 24, 33 Am. Rep. x.
12 (1879), 3 Lea 42.
13 (889), 83 Ga. 219.
14 (1887), Penn., ii AtI. 300.
".(x899). 94 Fed. 238.
14 (1894), 78 Hun 146.

IT(88o),

54 Iowa, 59.
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he may maintain an action therefor. So the sole beneficiary of a
contract may maintain an action to recover property or money to
which he is entitled thereunder. In these cases the law implies a
promise on the part of the one holding the property or money to
account therefor- to the beneficiary. Other exceptions to the rule,
resting-upon similar principles, may exist. The case before us is
not an exception to the rule we have stated. The plaintiff received
benefits from the water thus supplied in common with all the people
of the city. These benefitg she receives just as she does other
benefits from the municipal government, as the benefits enjoyed
on account of improved streets, peace and order enforced by police
regulation, and the like."
While there, is the greatest confusion among the cases on the
question of the right of a third person to sue on a contract, the
above statement by the Iowa court may safely be declared incorrect.
In fact, it states no real exception-to "the rule at all. Of course one
may sue on an implied contract to recover property held by another
to which *he is entitled. Such an action is an ancient and wellknown common law proceeding, and is based, not on the contract by
which the defendant obtained the property, to which contract the
plaintiff is a stranger, but on the original liability arising out of the
possession by the defendant of the plaintiff's property. The contract
which the law implies is an orignial contract between the plaintiff
and defendant. Where, then, is there any exception to the general
rule requiring privity?
The leading case on 'the general question of the right of a third
party to sue on a contract, is Vrooman v. Turner.18 In this case the
court laid down the rule that there were two requisites essential to
the right, (i) an intention on the .part of the promisee to secure
some benefit to the third party, and (2) some privity between the
promisee and the party to be benefited, and some duty or obligation
owing from the promisee to the third person which would give the
latter a legal or equitable claim to the benefit of the prbmise.
Respecting the necessity of the first of these requisites, there is
practical unanimity of judicial opinion.19 As to the second requisite
there is much conflict. Many authorities hold that itris wholly
unnecessary. As an example, take the case of a grantee of real
property subject to a mortgage, who, where the grantor is not liable
for the debt, promises the latter to assume it. Here there is no
privity respecting the debt between the grantor and the mortgagee,
and no duty or obligation in respect thereto owing from the grantor
Is

(1877),

69 N. Y. 280.

1" See cases cited in note on page io6, Pomeroy's Code Remedies (4th Ed.).
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to the mortgagee. And yet many courts give the mortgagee the
right to sue upon this promise. The recent case of McKay v.
Ward2 0 takes this position, and cites a large number of cases from
many states, including Pennsylvania, Illinois, Nebraska, Iowa, and
Wisconsin, which support it. An elaborate dissenting opinion by
Chief Justice Bartch reviews the cases which take the contrary view.
But this phase of the question will be considered later in its proper
connection.
A number of the cases upon the liability of water companies for
losses by fire, refuse to allow the plaintiff to recover on the contract,
on the ground that the first of these two requisites is absent, i. e.,
that there is no intention on the part of the promisee (the city) to
secure a benefit to the property-owner. This view is expressed in
Akron Waterworks Co. v. Brownless,2' House v. Houston Waterworks Co., 22 Bush v. Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co.,23 Eaton v.
Fairbury
Waterworks Co., 24 Wainwright v. Queens County Water
Co., 25 and Wilkinson v. Light, Heat and Water Co. 26 In these cases
the contracts merely provided for the supplying of water for general
fire purposes. The Supreme Court of Texas said, in the House
case: "It was not made for the purpose of benefiting him [the
plaintiff] or the class to which he belongs. The object and purpose
of making the contract was to keep water in the mains which the
city might apply to use in the public fountains, by flushing the gutters, or in extinguishing fires in case a conflagration should occur."
And the Supreme Court of Idaho said, in the Bush case: "There
is nothing in the contract in this case which intimates that any
breach of contract between the city of Boise and the defendant was
to inure to the benefit of any citizen who might consider himself
aggrieved."
But on .this point the courts of Kentucky, North Carolina and
Louisiana take a directly contrary view. In Gorrell v. Greensboro
Water Supply Co., 27 Clark, J., in delivering the opinion of the court,
said: "It is true, the plaintiff is neither a party nor privy to the
contract, but it is impossible to read the same without seeing that,
in warp and woof, in thread and filling, the object is the comfort,
ease and security from fire of the people, the citizens of Greens10(z899),

20 Utah, 149.

21 (1895), 10 Ohio C. C. 620.
2 (x895), 88 Tex. 233, 28 L. R. A. 532.
14 (x8gs), Idaho, 43 Pac. 69.

" (1393), 37 Neb. 546, 21 L. R. A. 653.
21(1894), 78 Hun 146.
(x9oo), 78 Miss. 389.
21 (1899), 124 N. C. 328, 46 L. R. A. 543.

26
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boro. * * * The benefit to the nominal contracting party, the
city of Greensboro, as a corporation, is small in comparison, and,
taken alone, would never have justified the grants, concessions,
privileges, benefits and payments made to the water company. Upon
the face of the contract, the principal beneficiaries of the contract
in contemplation of both parties thereto were the water company
6n the one hand, and the individual citizens of Greensboro on the
other. The citizens were to pay the taxes to fulfill the money consideration named; and furnishing the individual citizens with adequate supply of water, and the protection of their property from
fire, was the largest duty assumed by the company. * * * Did
the people of Greensboro have just cause to believe that by virtue
of that contract they, as well, as the corporation, were guaranteed
a sufficient quantity of water to protect their property from fire;
and did the water company understand it was agreeing, for the
valuable consideration named, to furnish a sufficient quantity of
water to protect private as well as public property from fire? The
intent is to be drawn from the instrument itself, and on its face
there can be no doubt it was contracted that the water supply
should be sufficient to protect public as well as private property. If
so, it follows that when, by breach of that contract, private property
was destroyed; the owner thereof, one of the beneficiaries contemplated by the contract, is the party in interest and he, and he alone,
can maintain an action for his loss." And similar views are
expressed in Graves County Water Co. v. Ligon,28 Duncan v.
Owensboro Water Co.,29 and Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah
Water Supply Co.30
In Planters' Oil Mill v. Monroe Waterworks and Light Co.,3 ' the
court said: "Municipal governments, while legal entities, are no
more than convenient regulations instituted by the people, that they
may act in their aggregate character to secure their larger protection and happiness. Municipalities are the people acting in their
corporate capacity. It was the people's money that was paid the
Water Company; it was for the benefit of the people that the
promise was made on part of the company to supply water for
extinguishing fires. If it were to the public that the promise of the
contract was made, then it was to 'the public as composed of individual persons'. The municipality was but the agent of thie public
28 (1902),

112

Ky. 775, 66 S. W. 725.

29 (x889), Ky., 12 S. W. 557.
80 (1889),
89 Ky. 340, 7 L. R. A. 77.

The very recent case of Lexington Hydraulic
Co. v. Oats (19o5), - Ky. -, 84 S. W. 774, reaffirms the Paducah case after a re-examination of the question.
s1 (1goo), 52 La. Ann. 1243.
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as thus composed. Its acts in the matter of the contract under
consideration were chiefly fiduciary. The beneficiaries are the
corporators. It will not do to say the Water Company owes them
no duty."
These opinions are quoted at some length because they seem to
the writer to express a very sensible and reasonable view. Everyone knows that the people vote and pay taxes for public water rates
solely because they wish protection for their property. The more
valuable their property the more ready are they to pay for fire protection. To suppose that the voter has in mind that invisible,
intangible, imaginary "general public" whiich owns no particular
property when he authorizes his agent, the city government, to
grant franchises and pay large sums of money for fire hydrants and
fire pressure, is absurd. He has in mind no such figment of the
legal imagination. He is thinking of the actual buildings that
actually stand along the streets of his city, and he votes to pay for
water to protect those very buildings from fire. To say that he
pays for the protection of everybody in general but nobody in particular, not even himself, is to credit him with too much benevolence
and too little common sense.
It is possible that those courts which deny to the property-owner
the right to sue the water company,. on the ground that he is not
the intended beneficiary, confuse two things which are quite distinct. A city which owns and operates waterworks is not liable to
an individual for negligence in connection therewith. But this is
not because the city in providing fire protection, and the voters in
authorizing it, and the taxpayers in maintaining it, are not acting
for the good of the property-owners of the city. The existence of
taxable property subject to loss by fire is the single and sole inducement for the city to take up the burden of a public water supply
for fire purposes. But some of the cases say that the city acts for
the "general public," and not for the property-owners, and hence
the individual property-owner has no legal interest in the undertaking. This confuses the ground of the state's action in authorizing the city to maintain the waterworks, with the ground of the
city's action in exercising the authority. The state authorizes the
city to perform the function because it deems it beneficial to the
whole public. But the city undertakes the performance because it
deems it beneficial to its own property-owners. From the point of
view of the state the supplying of public fire protection is a benefit
to the general public, irrespective of the incidental good derived by
individuals. Being a general, public benefit, it is peculiarly within
the control of the state as the supreme governmental authority. In
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other words, providing it is a governmental function. Now, when
governmental functions are delegated to municipalities, the immunity of the state from suits by citizens accompanies their exercise.
It makes no difference that- the sole object which the city has in
undertaking them is the protection of. the property of the citizens.
It is the governmental character of the function which creates the
exemption, not the nature of the beneficiary, as some of the cases
seem to indicate. The individual property-owner is without a
remedy against the city simply because the city, in providing fire
protection, exercises the sovereign powers of the state and hence
cannot be sued, and not because the fire protection is not actually
furnished for his benefit. The fact that the protection is deemed a
benefit to the general public makes the city a governmental agent
of the state in providing it, and it is this which exempts the city
from suit, although the city is actually induced to furnish it and
does furnish it solely for the benefit of its citizens. As the court
said, in Springfield Insurance Co. v. Keeseville (supra), if "the
defendant assumed a governmental function," then it "comes under
the sanction of the rule which exempts government from suits by
citizens." It is therefore a non-sequitur to say that because the city
is not liable to individuals, a water company which performs the
same acts is also .not liable. As a fact the city, when operating
waterworks, really acts for the same beneficiary as the water company. Both act, and must act, for the property owners of the city.
But"when the city so acts it is a discretionary agent of the state,
and simply cannot be sued; while the water company does not
represent the state and enjoys nosuch exemption. To hold, as some
of the cases cited do hold, that the exemption of the city from suit
by individuals is due to the public and general character of the
beneficiary, and that therefore the water company, which serves thi
same purpose, is also exempt, is to overlook the very basis of
municipal non-liability. The question is not one of beneficiaries at
all, but of a technical exemption from suit, granted, on grounds of
public policy, to cities, but denied to private corporations.
But there is another group of cases. requiring attention. To preclude the courts from taking -the position' that the property-owners
were not the intended beneficiaries under contracts with water cofipanies, cities began to insert into their contracts the express provision that, ifi case the water companies neglected to supply sufficient
water for fire purposes, as provided' for in the contracts, they
should be liable in damages to all persons whose property was
injured by reason of the inadequate supply. This, of course, rendered impossible the contention that the property-owners were not
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intended to be the beneficiaries. But the courts then took refuge in
the second of the requisites indicated in Vrooman v. Turner, namely,
the absence of any duty or obligation owing from the city to the
property-owners, which would support an action by the latter
against the water company.
Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Trenton Water Co. 2 is a typical case.
The plaintiff sued the Water Company for a fire loss due to the company's breach of contract with the city, basing its right to sue on the
ordinance granting the franchise, which provided: "Should said
water company * * * fail to furnish a reasonable or adequate
supply of water to extinguish any fire, then it shall be liable for all
damages occasioned by all such fire or neglect." But the court
refused to allow a recovery, on the ground that it was necessary,
to entitle a third person to sue on a contract, that there should be
some debt or duty owing by the promisee to the third party, citing
Vroontan v. Turner. "In the case at bar," said the court, "the contracting parties were the City of Trenton and the water company.
The insurance company is the third party suing and wanting to
obtain the benefit of the promise of the water company made to the
city. But an essential element is lacking. The city owes no legal
duty to the insurance company to furnish water with which to
extinguish fires.

*

*

*

*

Conceding that it stands subrogated

to whatever right the assured had, what are his rights in a case of
this sort against the water company? None whatever."
The same doctrine was subsequently approved by the Missouri
Supreme Court, in Howsmon v. Trenton Water Co.3" Mott v.
Cherryvale Water Co.34 is based on the same doctrine, though it is
not so fully stated. It was there held that since the city, had it
owned the waterworks, would not have been liable for such damages, there was" no legal obligation owing from the city to its
property-holders which would make a contract of this kind between
the city and the company, available to the individuals who owned
property in the city. And the Supreme Court of Iowa announced
the same rule in Becker v. Keokuk Waterworks Co. 35 In this case

it was held that the law under which the city contracted with the
water company conferred no powers upon the city to make a contract of indemnity for the individual benefit of a taxpayer, for a
breach of which an action would lie against the water company.
This, I take it, must be on the ground that there is no duty or obli32

(z8go),

42 Mo. App. rz8.

3 (1893), 119 Mo. 304, 23 L. R. A. 146.
3 (x892), 48 Kan. x2, zS L. R. A. 375.

" (18go),

79 Iowa, 419, z8 Am. bt. Rep. 397.
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gation owing from the city to its taxpayers. The court, in effect,
said that the contract was ultra vires, but it seems clear that the
court meant simply that the relation of the city to the taxpayers
was not such that the city could, by contract, confer any rights
upon them against the water company. This principle seems to be
an essential ground of the decision in Wainwright v. Queens County
Water Co.386 and in Boston. Safe-Deposit Co. v. Salem Water Co.,"
and was one of the grounds in House v. Houston Waterworks Co. 8
Eaton v. Fairbury Waterworks Co.,3' and Vanhorn v. City of Des
Moines"' though some of these cases did not contain the special contract of liability to taxpayers. It may be incidentally noted that in
several of*these cases the argument was made that the imposition of
a special tax on the property-owners to pay for the public water
service created a legal privity between the water company and the
taxpayers. But the courts in every instance held, and we think
very correctly, that this feature in no respect altered the situation
as it would have existed had the public water rates been paid out
of the general tax levies.
If, as these cases hold, the second requisite of Vrooman v. Turner
is necessary, they are probably rightly decided, although there
might still be a question whether there is not such a duty owing
from a city to its property-owning citizens as will give them the
right to sue on a contract made for their benefit. In Buchanan v.
Tilden"l the duty owing from the promisee to the third person was
largely a moral one. The promise was made to a husband by
another for the benefit of his wife, and this relation, taken in connection with the peculiar equities of the case, was held sufficient to
enable the wife to sue the promisor. In Dutton v. Poole,'2 the
Exchequer Chamber held that the relation between a father and
child was sufficient. And in Todd v. Weber'5 the relation between
a father and an illegitimate daughter was held sufficient to satisfy
the rule. In none of these cases was the duty a legal or even an
equitable one, and no action could have been founded upon it
directly. By analogy it might very well be argued that a city is
under a duty, extra-legal but no less real, to provide fire protection
(1894),
(1899),
31 (z8gs),
10 (z893),

39

37

78
94
88
37

Hun 146.
Fed. 238.
Tex. 233, 28 L. R. .i. 532.
Neb. 546, 21 L. R. A. 653.

40 (1884),
63 Iowa, 447. The very recent case of Blunk v. Dennison Water Supply Co.
(igoS), - Ohio St. -, 73 N . E. 2xo, bases a similar conclusion exclusively on the case of

Vrooman v. Turner.
41 (1899), 158 N. Y. log.
42 2 Lev. 212, Raym. 302.
43 (884), 95 N. Y. 181.
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to its citizens. And there are statements in some of the cases to
this effect: Thus in Nickerson v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co.,"
quoted supra, the court said: "The city owed a public duty to the
plaintiffs to extinguish their fire. The hydrants were not supplied
with water, and so the city was unable to perform its duty." Again,
in Bienville Water-supply Co. v. Mobile,45 a bill was filed by the
city to enjoin the water company from shutting off the water in the
public hydrants, and the court said: "But the company also owes
a duty to the public. Neither it nor the city would be permitted,
summarily and without making some other provision for the safety
of the public, to shut off the water. * * * Changes may and
do take place, but where such agencies have thus become incorporated into the municipality itself, it would be the duty of the
court to see that these changes are not so violent or summary as
to endanger public or private property." But this question is a
complex and difficult one and cannot be followed further here.
However, if the second requisite of Vrooman v. Turner is not
necessary, it would seem that the group of cases above cited rests
upon a very questionable foundation. The two Missouri cases of
Housman v. Trenton Water Co., and Phoenix Insurance Co. v.
Trenton Water Co., have already been discussed. These were both
decided for the defendant on the ground that there was no duty
or obligation owing from the promisee to the plaintiff, the court
citing and quoting Vroornan v. Turner. Now, in 1898 the case of
Hicks v. Hamilton"6 came before Division One of the Supreme
Court, wherein a mortgagee brought suit against a remote grantee
who had promised his grantor to pay the mortgage debt, the said
grantor not being personally liable for it. The court said that
Vrooman v. Turner involved precisely the same question, cited
both the above watercompany cases in support of their decision, and
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue. But two years later,
in I9oO, the same question was presented in Crone v. Stinde," and
the court in banc expressly overruled the Hicks case, holding that,
"The consideration passing between the two contracting parties,
by which one of them promises to pay a third, is just. as available
to the beneficiary as if he himself had paid the consideration."
And it was intimated that the two water company cases would have
to go by the board.
In Nebraska, also, in the case of Hare v. Murphys the same
,4 (1878), 46 Conn. 24.
45 (x896), 112 Ala. 260, 33 L. R. A. 59.
4' 144 MO. 495.

1 Mo. 262.
256
(1895), 45 Neb. 809.
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doctrine respecting the right of a mortgagee to sue, was approved,
the court saying: "It is an -established rule of law that where
one makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third person,
such third person may maintain an action upon the promise, though
the consideration does not move directly from him." This case,
having been decided after the case of Eaton v. Fairbury Waterworks Co., supra, overrules the latter in principle, so far as it is
based on the lack of a duty or obligation owing from the city to the
property-owner. The Pennsylvania case of Beck v. Kittanning
Water Co., supra, is inconsistent in principle with Merriman v.
Moore,49 which allows a mortgagee to sue a remote grantee on a
promise made for his benefit to a grantor who is not liable to him.
In the late case of Tweeddale v. Tweeddale,5" the broad doctrine
was laid down that "where one person, for a consideration moving
to him from another, promises to pay to a third person a sum of
money, the law immediately operates upon the acts of the parties,
establishing the essential of privity between the promisor and the
third person requisite to .binding contractual relations between them,
resulting in the immediate establishment of a new relation of debtor
and creditor, regardless of the relations of the third party to the
immediate promisee in the transaction." As must be apparent from
the discussion of the Kentucky, North Carolina and Louisiana cases,
supra, those courts likewise hold that the second requisite of Vrooman v. Turner is wholly unnecessary in order to authorize an action
against the water company by a taxpayer."1
Our conclusion on this branch of the question is, although the
discussion has necessarily been very brief and fragmentary, that
the better rile does not require any duty or obligation owing from
the promisee to the third person, and that when once it appears that
a contract was intentionally made for the primary benefit of a third
person, that person is ipso facto entitled to sue upon it.
It has been attempted, in several cases, to base the action against
the water company on tort, so as to avoid the technical difficulties
incident to an action on the contract. But this theory has received2
little support from the courts. In Fitch v. Seymour Water Co.,3
it was cofitended by the plaintiff that the relation between the city
and the water company was not in its nature contractual, but was
in fact founded upon a franchise and was therefore a relation created
by law under the power conferred on the common council by the
4

(1879), go Pa. Sts 78.

50 (1903), xz6 Wis. 517.
51 See, in addition to the cases

already cited, Owensboro Water Co. v. Duncan's
Adm'x (1895), Ky., 32 S. W. 478, and Jones v. Durham Water Co. (904), 135 N. C. 553.
52 (x894), x39 Ind. 2r4, 47 Am. St. Rep. 258.
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constitution and laws of the state. Hence the obligation resting
upon the water company to furnish sufficient water for fire protection had all the binding force of a statutory enactment, and for
a breach of this public duty the water company was liable to any
inhabitant of the city who suffered damage thereby. But the court
held that the ordinance which gave effect to the contract with the
water company was not one which the city was under obligation
to enforce, since in enacting it the city moved in its governmental
capacity. Therefore no liability could accrue against the city for
failure to enforce it, and it followed that the ordinance imposed no
public duty upon the water company appointed by the city to carry
out the provisions of the ordinance. The only obligation, then, was
one based strictly on the contract with the city. The same conclusion was reached in Fowler v. Athens City Waterworks Co.,53 and
in Wilkinson v. Light, Heat and Water Co. 4 The case of Fisherv.
Greensboro Water Supply Co. 5 holds that an action in tort will lie,
but upon reasoning which seems very loose and unsatisfactory.
In a few cases the position has been taken by the courts that the
loss of the property by fire was not the proximate result of the
failure to furnish sufficient water, even conceding that the loss
would not have occurred had there been sufficient water available.
This was the view taken in Foster v. Lookout Water Co.,5 6 Patch
v. City of Covington, 7 and House v. Houston Waterworks Co."8
This doctrine has been wholly abandoned by the Kentucky courts,
and was only incidentally mentioned in the Foster and House cases.
If it be granted that the contract was made for the benefit of the
taxpayers, the position seems untenable.
One-other important case demands attention. -In all the cases
heretofore examined, the loss was suffered by an individual taxpayer. In the very recent case of Ukiah v. Ukiah Water Co.,5 9
the property of the city itself was damaged by fire by reason of the
failure of the water company to furnish a sufficient supply of water.
This would seem, on first view, to eliminate the question of privity,
and to relieve the case of all the difficulties which we have been
discussing. But the court held that the water company was under
no liability to the city for the loss of its property, notwithstanding
that such loss had occurred by reason of the company's failure to
" (1889),
(19oo),
(9o),
9
6 (879),
5' (z856),
58 (z895),
64

69 (1o94),

83 Ga. 219.
78 Miss. 389.
128 N. C. 375.
3 Lea (71 Tenn.) 42.
17 B. Mon. 722.
88 Tex. 233, 28 L. R. A. 532.
142 Cal. z73.
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keep its contract with the city. "Doubtless," said the court, "a
water company may so bind itself by contract with a person to
furnish him water for the extinguishment of fires as to render
itself liable for the value of property of such person destroyed by
fire, by reason of its failure to furnish him a sufficient supply of
water. It may be assumed here that it is within the power of a
municipality as a property-owner, to enter into such a contract with
a water.company for the protection of the property which it owlis
as a legal individual, but it certainly needs something more than
evidence showing an accepted service for general fire purposes to
establish such a contract, and the evidence here shows nothing more.
The distinction 'between the powers conferred on municipal corporations for public purposes and for the general public good and
those conferred for private corporate purposes is clearly marked
by the decisions. In providing protection against fire to its inhabitants, tile municipality exercises a power conferred solely for the
general public good, and from the exercise of which the municipality, as a property-owner, derives the same incidental benefit that
every other property-owner does,-no more, no less. Yet in each
there is a contractual relation. The bar to such a recovery in each
case is, that the contract was not for the protection of any particular property or person, but was for general benefit of all the
property and persons within the municipal limits, and was entered
into by the town as- a public agency, solely for that purpose, and
in the exercise of its power to furnish such general protection. I
cannot escape the conclusion that the relations between plaintiff and
defendant, as shown by the evidence, are susceptible of no other
construction; that the defendant assumed no obligation regarding
plaintiff's property different from that assumed by it regarding all
of the other property within the town; and that the plaintiff as a
property-owner,. is without right of action."
Assuming the correctness of the premises in this case-an assumption which does not, in fact, seem tenable, as has been pointed
out-, the conclusion is substantially sound. If the contract was
made by the city as a. governmental agency, solely for the benefit of
the "general public," and not for the benefit of the property-owners
of the city, and the water company entered into the contract with
that understanding, then the damages sustained by any propertyowner, whether it be the city or an individual, could not be presumed
to have been within the contemplation of the parties, and hence
could not become the basis for estimating damages for a breach
of the contract, under the well-known rule of Hadley v. Baxen-
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dale.60 Under these premises, the damages recoverable by the city
could be only the difference, if any, between the value of the water
supply and fire pressure actually furnished, and the value of the
water supply and fire pressure which the company agreed to furnish,
estimated with reference to the uses for which the water and fire
were furnished.8 ' It was sought in Ferrisv. Carson Water
pressure
Co.6 2 to invest the city with a further claim for damages by reason
of the diminution in its taxable property due to the fire, but the
court said: "The right of taxation vested in the authorities of the
city by the legislature did not create an interest, but rather- an
expectation, which was subject to have been defeated by contingencies that may have arisen, and was altogether too remote to be
the foundation of a right of action."
Aside from an action for damages, the only further remedy as
against anyone would be a' rescission of the contract at the suit of
the city. In Light, Heat and Water Co. v. City of Jackson,6 3 the
court said: "The remedy by rescission, which the courts are
reluctant to afford when adequate damages for breach of contract
may be recovered at law, is peculiarly appropriate in cases of this
character." But it is beyond the scope of this article to consider
the conditions under which the remedy is available.
It must be very clear from this brief discussion of the liability
of water companies for fire losses, that the question is merely one
phase of the larger question respecting the right of a third person
to sue upon a contract. There has been no attempt here to treat
that vast and complex subject systematically. I have merely tried to
analyze the cases directly touching the special case of the right to
sue water companies, and to suggest the obvious merits and defects
of the arguments upon which they rest.
EDSON
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SUNDERLAND.
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61 Joplin Waterworks Co.

62(x88:),
G3(189S),
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177 Mo. 496.

16 Nev. 44.
73 Miss. 646.
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